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Single Idea 21648

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism ]

Full Idea

A major flaw of the neo-Fregean program is that it is more impressed by the technical result that Peano Arithmetic can be interpreted by second-order logic plus Hume's Principle, than empirical considerations about how numbers come about.

Gist of Idea

Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3)

Book Ref

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.159


A Reaction

This doesn't sound like a problem that would bother Fregeans or neo-Fregeans much. Deriving the Peano Axioms from various beginnings has become a parlour game for modern philosophers of mathematics.


The 30 ideas from 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics'

Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]