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Single Idea 10523

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta ]

Full Idea

The abstract/concrete distinction is, roughly, between those sortals whose grounding relations can hold between abstract things which are spatially but not temporally separated, those concrete things whose grounding relations cannot so hold.

Gist of Idea

Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated

Source

Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III)

Book Ref

Hale,Bob: 'Abstract Objects' [Blackwell 1987], p.59

A Reaction

Thus being a father is based on 'begat', which does not involve spatial separation, and so is concrete. The relation is one of equivalence.

The 60 ideas from Bob Hale

8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
10310 Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
10307 The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale]
10308 Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
10312 Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
10313 Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
10314 An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale]
10316 We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
10315 We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
10318 Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
10322 If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
10511 It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
10513 Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale]
10514 If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale]
10512 The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
10517 Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale]
10518 Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale]
10521 If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
10523 Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale]
10522 The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
10520 Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
10519 The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]
10524 There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
19275 You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
19276 The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
19278 There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
19279 What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
19281 Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
19282 It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
19285 Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
19286 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
19288 Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
19287 Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
19289 Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
19290 Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
19291 A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
19293 Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
19294 If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
19295 Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
19296 If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
19297 The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
19298 Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
19299 Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
19300 The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
19301 With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
19302 If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
10632 The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright]
12432 Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
12433 If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
12434 Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
12435 The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
12436 Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]