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Single Idea 8778

[filed under theme 18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique ]

Full Idea

It is not true that men born blind can form no colour-concepts; a man born blind can use the word 'red' with a considerable measure of intelligence; he can show a practical grasp of the logic of the word.

Gist of Idea

Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently

Source

Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10)

Book Ref

Geach,Peter: 'Mental Acts: Their content and their objects' [RKP 1971], p.35

A Reaction

Weak. It is obvious that they pick up the word 'red' from the usage of sighted people, and the usage of the word doesn't guarantee a grasp of the concept, as when non-mathematicians refer to 'calculus'. Compare Idea 7377 and Idea 7866.

Related Ideas

Idea 7377 Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]

Idea 7866 Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]

The 28 ideas with the same theme [reasons to reject the abstractionist explanation]:

9075 If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
15385 Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
9096 The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas]
8638 Thomae's idea of abstract from peculiarities gives a general concept, and leaves the peculiarities [Frege on Thomae]
9979 Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait]
11846 If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]
9588 Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
5816 Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
9819 Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
9851 Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
10733 The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
10734 Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
8771 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
8772 We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
8773 Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
8774 The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
8778 Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
8777 If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
8779 We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
9833 To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett]
8165 To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett]
16289 We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis]
9074 Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J]
9073 Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J]
9072 Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J]
9146 After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K]
9972 Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
9980 If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]