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Single Idea 8905

[filed under theme 18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation ]

Full Idea

A theory of non-spatiotemporal parts of things, whether recurring universals or non-recurring tropes, makes good sense of some abstractions. Unit negative charge is a universal common to particles, and an abstraction by being part of them.

Gist of Idea

If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts

Source

David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.7)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.85

A Reaction

He cautiously refers to 'some' abstractions. It is one of Donald Williams's proud boasts concerning his trope theory that it will handle this problem well. I'm not sure that we should be saying that abstractions are actually concrete bits of things.

Related Idea

Idea 8906 If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis]

The 94 ideas from 'On the Plurality of Worlds'

10470 There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver]
12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
9650 Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis]
16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
9651 Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis]
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
9658 An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis]
15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
15747 Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
9654 A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
15736 A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
15731 Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
9659 Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
8909 Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
8901 Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis]
8904 The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis]
8938 The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis]
8903 Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis]
8902 If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis]
8906 If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis]
8905 If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis]
8908 For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis]
8907 The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis]
9660 The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
16278 A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis]
16279 General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
9661 Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis]
16280 Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis]
16274 If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis]
16281 Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis]
11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
16288 Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis]
16289 We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]
9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9666 It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis]
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]
9057 Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
9671 Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]