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Single Idea 13692
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
]
Full Idea
For a 'precisification' we take a trivalent interpretation and preserve the T and F values, and then assign all the third values in some way to either T or F.
Clarification
A 'trivalent' interpretation has T, F and a third value, such as 'undetermined'
Gist of Idea
A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation
Source
Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 3.4.5)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Logic for Philosophy' [OUP 2010], p.83
A Reaction
[my informal summary of Sider's formal definition]
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[narrowing down the vagueness]:
23541
|
Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man'
[Fine,K]
|
9767
|
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise
[Fine,K]
|
9770
|
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values
[Fine,K]
|
9772
|
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision)
[Fine,K]
|
9773
|
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work
[Fine,K]
|
9774
|
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision
[Fine,K]
|
9049
|
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9056
|
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9058
|
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9059
|
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9060
|
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise
[Keefe/Smith]
|
21592
|
Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics
[Williamson]
|
21603
|
You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague
[Williamson]
|
21604
|
Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected
[Williamson]
|
21607
|
Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided
[Williamson]
|
21608
|
Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation
[Williamson]
|
21609
|
Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid'
[Williamson]
|
21610
|
Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic
[Williamson]
|
21613
|
Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness
[Williamson]
|
16208
|
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range
[Hawley]
|
16221
|
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved
[Hawley]
|
13692
|
A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation
[Sider]
|
13693
|
A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification
[Sider]
|
13695
|
Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator
[Sider]
|
13694
|
We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings
[Sider]
|
11012
|
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments
[Read]
|
11013
|
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations
[Read]
|
11019
|
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place
[Read]
|
15363
|
In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts
[Horsten]
|
15362
|
If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't
[Horsten]
|