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Single Idea 9048
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
]
Full Idea
The simplest approach to vagueness is to retain classical logic and semantics. Borderline cases are either true or false, but we don't know which, and, despite appearances, vague predicates have well-defined extensions. Vagueness is ignorance.
Gist of Idea
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics
Source
R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1)
Book Ref
'Vagueness: a Reader', ed/tr. Keefe,R /Smith,P [MIT 1999], p.6
A Reaction
It seems to me that you must have a rather unhealthy attachment to the logicians' view of the world to take this line. It is the passion of the stamp collector, to want everything in sets, with neatly labelled properties, and inference lines marked out.
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:
12516
|
Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory
[Locke]
|
12517
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Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas
[Locke]
|
23542
|
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause
[Fine,K]
|
9044
|
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9048
|
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9055
|
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary
[Keefe/Smith]
|
6863
|
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge
[Williamson]
|
21591
|
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which
[Williamson]
|
21619
|
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is
[Williamson]
|
21620
|
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance
[Williamson]
|
21622
|
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use
[Williamson]
|
9120
|
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts
[Williamson]
|
16226
|
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons
[Hawley]
|
9116
|
Vague words have hidden boundaries
[Sorensen]
|