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Single Idea 16457
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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Full Idea
One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.
Gist of Idea
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
Source
report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
Book Ref
'Vagueness: a Reader', ed/tr. Keefe,R /Smith,P [MIT 1999], p.319
A Reaction
Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.
Related Idea
Idea 16458
Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis]
The
23 ideas
from Gareth Evans
9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
|
9038
|
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
[Evans]
|
5823
|
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
[Evans]
|
9039
|
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
[Evans]
|
9040
|
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs
[Evans]
|
9043
|
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
[Evans]
|
5825
|
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
[Evans]
|
5824
|
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
[Evans]
|
9042
|
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
[Evans]
|
7639
|
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
[Evans]
|
14895
|
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
[Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
|
11881
|
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
[Evans, by Mackie,P]
|
16129
|
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
[Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
|
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
[Evans]
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16457
|
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
[Evans, by Lewis]
|
16460
|
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
[Evans, by Lewis]
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14484
|
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
[Evans, by Thomasson]
|
16224
|
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b
[Evans, by PG]
|
12580
|
Experiences have no conceptual content
[Evans, by Greco]
|
23794
|
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
|
12575
|
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
[Evans, by Peacocke]
|
7643
|
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
[Evans]
|
16366
|
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
[Evans]
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