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Single Idea 19227

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy ]

Full Idea

Philosophy differs from mathematics in being a search for real truth.

Gist of Idea

Philosophy is a search for real truth

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.115


A Reaction

This is important, coming from the founder of pragmatism, in rejecting the anti-realism which a lot of modern pragmatists seem to like.


The 40 ideas from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'

Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]