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Single Idea 9408

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy ]

Full Idea

Science deals with the phenomena, ..but it is metaphysics, and only metaphysics, that tells us what ultimately exists.

Gist of Idea

Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists

Source

Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.2)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Laws in Nature' [Routledge 2006], p.6

The 70 ideas from Stephen Mumford

19068 Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14295 Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
14306 Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
14307 Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14311 Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
14319 Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14320 Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14322 If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14324 Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14337 Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
14338 In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
14339 Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
14340 It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
14341 Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
14342 General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14343 To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
14344 Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
9408 Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
9412 You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
9411 There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
9416 Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
9415 Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
9421 The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
9422 If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
9427 For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
9429 Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
9430 Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
9431 Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
9432 Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
9433 If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
9434 Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
9435 A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
12248 How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
9437 To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
9439 The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
9441 Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
9443 It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
9444 There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
9445 We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9446 Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
18617 Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
18618 Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
18619 Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
18620 Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]