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Full Idea
The alleged paradox of analysis asserts that if one knew what was involved in the concept, one would not need the analysis; if one did not know what was involved in the concept, no analysis could be forthcoming.
Gist of Idea
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't?
Source
David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1)
Book Ref
Ruben,David-Hillel: 'Explaining Explanation' [Routledge 1990], p.9
A Reaction
This is the sort of problem that seemed to bug Plato a lot. You certainly can't analyse something if you don't understand it, but it seems obvious that you can illuminatingly analyse something of which you have a reasonable understanding.
Related Ideas
Idea 9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
Idea 17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |