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Single Idea 2481
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
]
Full Idea
The general truth is that nothing ever reduces to anything, however hard philosophers may try.
Gist of Idea
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.66
The
41 ideas
from 'In a Critical Condition'
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2465
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Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
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2469
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The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
[Fodor]
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2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
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2470
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Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
[Fodor]
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2473
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Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
[Fodor]
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2474
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It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
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2475
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Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
[Fodor]
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
[Fodor]
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2477
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If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
[Fodor]
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2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
[Fodor]
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2484
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The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
[Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
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2485
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Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
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2482
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It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
[Fodor]
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2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
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2481
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Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
[Fodor]
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2489
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Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
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2490
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Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
[Fodor]
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2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
[Fodor]
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2493
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According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
[Fodor]
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2494
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Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
[Fodor]
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2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
[Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable
[Fodor]
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2496
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Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
[Fodor]
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2497
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Something must take an overview of the modules
[Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
[Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns
[Fodor]
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2502
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How do you count beliefs?
[Fodor]
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2501
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Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
[Fodor]
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2504
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Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
[Fodor]
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2508
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The function of a mind is obvious
[Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information
[Fodor]
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2505
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Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
[Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules
[Fodor]
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2503
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Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
[Fodor]
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2506
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If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
[Fodor]
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