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Single Idea 4731
[filed under theme 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
]
Full Idea
The four basic principles of rationality are 1) avoid contradiction, 2) enhance coherence, 3) avoid ignoring evidence, and 4) maximise evidence.
Gist of Idea
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
Source
Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5)
Book Ref
O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.141
A Reaction
I like this, and can't think of any additions. 'Coherence' is the vaguest of the conditions. Maximising evidence is still the driving force of science, even if it does sound quaintly positivist.
The
24 ideas
from 'Relativism'
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4698
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What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
[O'Grady]
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4697
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There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
[O'Grady]
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4706
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Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
[O'Grady]
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4701
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To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
[O'Grady]
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4703
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The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
[O'Grady]
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4705
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Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
[O'Grady]
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4700
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A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
[O'Grady]
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4704
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Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
[O'Grady]
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4715
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We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
[O'Grady]
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4710
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Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
[O'Grady]
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4717
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If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
[O'Grady]
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4709
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Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
[O'Grady]
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4711
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Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
[O'Grady]
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4727
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The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas
[O'Grady]
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4725
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Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
[O'Grady]
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4719
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Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
[O'Grady]
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4720
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Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
[O'Grady]
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4722
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Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
[O'Grady]
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4724
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Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
[O'Grady]
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4723
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Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
[O'Grady]
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4732
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One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
[O'Grady]
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4731
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Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
[O'Grady]
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4734
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Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
[O'Grady]
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4735
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Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality
[O'Grady]
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