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Single Idea 14079
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
]
Full Idea
To use Kripke's semantics, one needs extensive intuitions that certain properties are essential and others accidental.
Gist of Idea
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
Source
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], X)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.212
A Reaction
As usual, we could substitute the word 'necessary' for 'essential' without changing his meaning. If we are always referring to 'our' Hubert Humphrey is speculations about him, then nearly all of his properties will be necessary ones.
The
14 ideas
from 'Contingent Identity'
14064
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If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent
[Gibbard]
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14066
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A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay
[Gibbard]
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
[Gibbard]
|
14065
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Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
[Gibbard]
|
14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it
[Gibbard]
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14069
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We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay'
[Gibbard]
|
14071
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Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria
[Gibbard]
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14072
|
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
[Gibbard]
|
14073
|
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
[Gibbard]
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations
[Gibbard]
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14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition
[Gibbard]
|
14077
|
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts
[Gibbard]
|
14078
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Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
[Gibbard]
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14079
|
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
[Gibbard]
|