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Single Idea 11000

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

If each possible world constitutes a concrete reality, then no object can be present in more than one world - objects may have 'counterparts', but cannot be identical with them.

Gist of Idea

If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts

Source

Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.117

A Reaction

This explains clearly why in Lewis's modal realist scheme he needs counterparts instead of rigid designation. Sounds like a slippery slope. If you say 'Humphrey might have won the election', who are you talking about?

The 31 ideas with the same theme [there are only closely resembling possible entities]:

13080 Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
11972 Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
11973 Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
13726 Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
14763 Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
16239 To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
11000 If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
6133 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
14402 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]