more on this theme     |     more from this text

Single Idea 16411

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

Nothing can be in two places at once. If other possible worlds are really other universes, then clearly, you and I cannot be in them if we are here in this one.

Gist of Idea

If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.114

A Reaction

This can be sensibly expressed without possible worlds. I can't embody my other possibilities while I am embodying this one (I'm too busy). Insofar as possible worlds are a good framework, they are just a precise map of common sense.

Related Idea

Idea 16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]

The 65 ideas from Robert C. Stalnaker

12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
18052 An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
14718 An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]