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Single Idea 10933

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity ]

Full Idea

The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'.

Gist of Idea

Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility

Source

Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4

A Reaction

[She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility?

The 21 ideas from Adolph Rami

10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]