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Single Idea 10933

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity ]

Full Idea

The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'.

Gist of Idea

Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility

Source

Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4


A Reaction

[She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility?


The 26 ideas with the same theme [different ways in which things must be]:

A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden]
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]