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Full Idea
It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute.
Gist of Idea
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute
Source
Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.16
A Reaction
Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary.
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |