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Single Idea 11086

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity ]

Full Idea

Weak metaphysical necessity is either over the set of all logically possible worlds (in which case it is the same as logical necessity), or it is of a smaller set of worlds, and is determined by the underlying essence or nature of the actual world.

Gist of Idea

Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences)

Source

Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 6.6)

Book Ref

Hanna,Robert: 'Rationality and Logic' [MIT 2006], p.196


A Reaction

I take the first to be of no interest, as I have no interest in a world which is somehow rated as logically possible, but is not naturally possible. The second type should the principle aim of all human cognitive enquiry. The strong version is synthetic.


The 28 ideas from 'Rationality and Logic'

Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]