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Single Idea 18856

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity ]

Full Idea

According to the Non-Standard conception of Metaphysical Necessity, P is metaphysically necessary when its negation is logically incompatible with the nature of things.

Gist of Idea

Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things

Source

Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10)

Book Ref

'Identity and Modality', ed/tr. MacBride,Fraser [OUP 2006], p.39

A Reaction

Rosen's new second meaning of the term. My immediate problem is with it resting on being 'logically' incompatible. Are squares 'logically' incompatible with circles? I like the idea that it rests on 'the nature of things'. (Psst! natures = essences)

Related Ideas

Idea 18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]

Idea 18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]

The 29 ideas with the same theme [inescapable necessity as a feature of reality]:

444 The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
12668 Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
16425 Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
16424 Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
12207 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
16063 Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
13707 Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
16277 Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]
11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
18816 Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]