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Single Idea 15084

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity ]

Full Idea

McFetridge's view proves that if the conditional corresponding to a valid inference is logically necessary, then there is no sense in which it is possible that its antecedent be true but its consequent false. ..This result generalises to any statement.

Gist of Idea

In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is

Source

report of Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986]) by Bob Hale - Absolute Necessities 2

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.97

A Reaction

I am becoming puzzled by Hale's assertion that logical necessity is 'absolute', while resting his case on a conditional. Are we interested in the necessity of the inference, or the necessity of the consequent?

Related Idea

Idea 15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]

The 12 ideas from Ian McFetridge

15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]