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Single Idea 9481

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity ]

Full Idea

I do not regard logical necessitation as a kind of necessity. It is logically possible that George Orwell is not Eric Blair, but in what sense is this any kind of possibility? It arises from having two names, but that confers no genuine possibility.

Gist of Idea

Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility

Source

Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.48

A Reaction

How refreshing. All kinds of concepts like this are just accepted by philosophers as obvious, until someone challenges them. The whole undergrowth of modal thinking needs a good flamethrower taken to it.

The 34 ideas from 'Nature's Metaphysics'

14540 Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
23713 Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9449 The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird]
9507 Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
9473 Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
9474 A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
9475 A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9482 If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
9481 Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
9479 Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
9484 If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
9486 Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
9487 We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird]
9488 Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
9489 Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9491 Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
9493 We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
9494 Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9496 That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
9499 Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
9501 If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
9500 If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
9502 There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
9503 To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
9504 The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird]
9505 Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]