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Single Idea 10332

[filed under theme 28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions ]

Full Idea

The very idea of omniscience is dubious, at least for the communitarian epistemologist, since knowing is a social state, and knowledge is a social status, needing a position in a social network.

Gist of Idea

Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept

Source

Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4)

Book Ref

Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.42


A Reaction

A nice test case. Would an omniscient mind have evidence for its beliefs? Would it continually check for coherence? Is it open to criticism? Does it even entertain the possibility of error? Could another 'omniscient' mind challenge it?


The 28 ideas from 'Knowledge by Agreement'

Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch]
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch]
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch]
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch]
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch]
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch]
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch]
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch]
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch]
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch]
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch]
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch]
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]
Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch]
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch]
Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch]
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch]