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Single Idea 17841
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
]
Full Idea
A thing may be formally indivisible, something cognitively and scientifically indivisible. Hence what cause substances to be single things should be thought of as the primary unity.
Gist of Idea
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance
Source
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a31)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.286
A Reaction
This is his fourth and final proposal for unity, and it is obviously his preferred theory, because it is the hylomorphic view, that the form or nature of the thing bestows the unity. It is sort of right, but a rather thin theory as it stands.
The
335 ideas
from 'Metaphysics'
|
12080
|
Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
22154
|
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality
[Aristotle, by Boulter]
|
|
12339
|
Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful
[Aristotle, by Badiou]
|
|
16778
|
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances
[Aristotle, by Pasnau]
|
|
12345
|
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
16095
|
Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
11199
|
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence
[Aristotle, by Aquinas]
|
|
12304
|
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge
[Aristotle, by Copi]
|
|
15107
|
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
|
543
|
All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses
[Aristotle]
|
|
12038
|
Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know')
[Aristotle, by Annas]
|
|
11245
|
Many memories make up a single experience
[Aristotle]
|
|
9088
|
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things
[Aristotle]
|
|
544
|
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals
[Aristotle]
|
|
545
|
It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
546
|
It takes skill to know causes, not experience
[Aristotle]
|
|
547
|
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge
[Aristotle]
|
|
11242
|
Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes
[Aristotle]
|
|
548
|
Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom
[Aristotle]
|
|
11241
|
Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct
[Aristotle]
|
|
549
|
All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas
[Aristotle]
|
|
11247
|
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation
[Aristotle]
|
|
11256
|
Materialists cannot explain change
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
1576
|
If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive
[Aristotle]
|
|
559
|
Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful
[Aristotle]
|
|
560
|
Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things
[Aristotle]
|
|
11258
|
We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty
[Aristotle]
|
|
561
|
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many?
[Aristotle]
|
|
11262
|
Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11263
|
Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
562
|
Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth?
[Aristotle]
|
|
11264
|
Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11265
|
Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11266
|
Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11267
|
Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11268
|
Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11269
|
Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
566
|
If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity?
[Aristotle]
|
|
11270
|
Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12074
|
The one in number just is the particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
16090
|
Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
11271
|
Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11272
|
Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11273
|
Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11274
|
Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11275
|
Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11276
|
Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11385
|
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable
[Aristotle]
|
|
568
|
Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances
[Aristotle]
|
|
569
|
If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
570
|
Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists'
[Aristotle]
|
|
12347
|
The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science
[Aristotle]
|
|
571
|
Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated?
[Aristotle]
|
|
572
|
Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry
[Aristotle]
|
|
573
|
The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy
[Aristotle]
|
|
6561
|
A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time)
[Aristotle]
|
|
574
|
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress
[Aristotle]
|
|
11281
|
We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man
[Aristotle]
|
|
575
|
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth
[Aristotle]
|
|
576
|
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former
[Aristotle]
|
|
581
|
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there!
[Aristotle]
|
|
583
|
The starting point of a proof is not a proof
[Aristotle]
|
|
584
|
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation
[Aristotle]
|
|
585
|
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes?
[Aristotle]
|
|
1602
|
For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential
[Roochnik on Aristotle]
|
|
1601
|
The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time
[Aristotle]
|
|
586
|
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't
[Aristotle]
|
|
19165
|
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes
[Aristotle, by Davidson]
|
|
588
|
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise
[Aristotle]
|
|
12611
|
Necessity makes alternatives impossible
[Aristotle]
|
|
12878
|
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter
[Aristotle, by Simons]
|
|
12612
|
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities
[Aristotle]
|
|
13272
|
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible
[Aristotle]
|
|
590
|
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations
[Aristotle]
|
|
12348
|
There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
11299
|
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence
[Aristotle]
|
|
11194
|
Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true
[Aristotle, by Aquinas]
|
|
12060
|
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
11154
|
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa
[Aristotle]
|
|
15777
|
A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
15778
|
Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them
[Aristotle]
|
|
15779
|
Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false
[Aristotle]
|
|
15780
|
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical
[Aristotle]
|
|
13273
|
Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things
[Aristotle]
|
|
591
|
Excellence is a sort of completion
[Aristotle]
|
|
13274
|
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole
[Aristotle]
|
|
15852
|
A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it
[Aristotle]
|
|
12355
|
'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner
[Aristotle]
|
|
22171
|
If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
10913
|
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations
[Aristotle]
|
|
10914
|
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking
[Aristotle]
|
|
11234
|
The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11384
|
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location
[Aristotle]
|
|
592
|
The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
11279
|
Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
10941
|
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying
[Aristotle]
|
|
10962
|
It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter'
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
|
12061
|
The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent
[Aristotle]
|
|
10942
|
If you extract all features of the object, what is left over?
[Aristotle]
|
|
595
|
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia]
[Aristotle]
|
|
16590
|
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category
[Aristotle]
|
|
11290
|
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness
[Aristotle]
|
|
11289
|
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible
[Aristotle]
|
|
11291
|
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature
[Aristotle]
|
|
11288
|
Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else
[Aristotle]
|
|
10964
|
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
|
10963
|
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
|
11292
|
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition
[Aristotle]
|
|
10944
|
A definition must be of something primary
[Aristotle]
|
|
10945
|
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are'
[Aristotle]
|
|
10946
|
Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality
[Aristotle]
|
|
12352
|
Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white
[Aristotle]
|
|
10947
|
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal
[Aristotle]
|
|
596
|
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition
[Aristotle]
|
|
11153
|
A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
10948
|
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior
[Aristotle]
|
|
16105
|
We know a thing when we grasp its essence
[Aristotle]
|
|
10949
|
Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
10950
|
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind
[Aristotle]
|
|
11285
|
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being
[Aristotle]
|
|
16575
|
Something must pre-exist any new production
[Aristotle]
|
|
10951
|
The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney'
[Aristotle]
|
|
597
|
Is there a house over and above its bricks?
[Aristotle]
|
|
10952
|
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds
[Aristotle]
|
|
10953
|
The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity
[Aristotle]
|
|
12360
|
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
10954
|
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men
[Aristotle]
|
|
16106
|
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
[Aristotle]
|
|
10955
|
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects)
[Aristotle]
|
|
11383
|
A definition is of the universal and of the kind
[Aristotle]
|
|
10956
|
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle?
[Aristotle]
|
|
10957
|
The material element may be essential to a definition
[Aristotle]
|
|
12301
|
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form
[Aristotle]
|
|
10958
|
Perhaps numbers are substances?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16107
|
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not
[Aristotle]
|
|
10959
|
The substance is the form dwelling in the object
[Aristotle]
|
|
10960
|
If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity?
[Aristotle]
|
|
10961
|
Definition by division is into genus and differentiae
[Aristotle]
|
|
12356
|
If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae
[Aristotle]
|
|
16142
|
A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
11379
|
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared
[Aristotle]
|
|
12093
|
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11380
|
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
16143
|
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality
[Aristotle]
|
|
16144
|
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
[Aristotle]
|
|
16145
|
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves
[Aristotle]
|
|
12311
|
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate
[Aristotle]
|
|
17040
|
If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too
[Aristotle]
|
|
16094
|
You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised
[Aristotle]
|
|
12094
|
No universals exist separately from particulars
[Aristotle]
|
|
599
|
We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances
[Aristotle]
|
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
16134
|
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object
[Aristotle]
|
|
16135
|
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences
[Aristotle]
|
|
11296
|
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
16136
|
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants
[Aristotle]
|
|
15840
|
If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element?
[Aristotle]
|
|
12362
|
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being
[Aristotle]
|
|
15853
|
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle
[Aristotle]
|
|
600
|
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear
[Aristotle]
|
|
601
|
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites
[Aristotle]
|
|
16753
|
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
603
|
How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16108
|
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities
[Aristotle]
|
|
16109
|
Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form
[Aristotle]
|
|
12098
|
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind
[Aristotle]
|
|
16110
|
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16085
|
Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
16086
|
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities
[Aristotle]
|
|
16152
|
Other types of being all depend on the being of substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
16113
|
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
11938
|
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it
[Aristotle]
|
|
15766
|
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things
[Aristotle]
|
|
15767
|
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen!
[Aristotle]
|
|
15768
|
An actuality is usually thought to be a process
[Aristotle]
|
|
15769
|
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence
[Aristotle]
|
|
14543
|
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows
[Aristotle]
|
|
14544
|
Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances
[Aristotle]
|
|
15770
|
Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given
[Aristotle]
|
|
16118
|
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things
[Aristotle]
|
|
15771
|
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity
[Aristotle]
|
|
15772
|
A thing's active function is its end
[Aristotle]
|
|
15773
|
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process
[Aristotle]
|
|
605
|
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
15774
|
We recognise potentiality from actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
15775
|
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true
[Aristotle]
|
|
10916
|
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together
[Aristotle]
|
|
15776
|
There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being
[Aristotle]
|
|
10915
|
The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that
[Aristotle]
|
|
17838
|
Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process
[Aristotle]
|
|
16508
|
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force
[Aristotle]
|
|
17839
|
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
17840
|
A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
17841
|
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
17842
|
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought
[Aristotle]
|
|
17843
|
The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number
[Aristotle]
|
|
17844
|
The unit is stipulated to be indivisible
[Aristotle]
|
|
607
|
None of the universals can be a substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
17845
|
If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle
[Aristotle]
|
|
17846
|
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
17847
|
You are one with yourself in form and matter
[Aristotle]
|
|
17848
|
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same
[Aristotle]
|
|
17849
|
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect
[Aristotle]
|
|
608
|
There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety
[Aristotle]
|
|
17850
|
Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one
[Aristotle]
|
|
17851
|
Number is plurality measured by unity
[Aristotle]
|
|
17852
|
A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction
[Aristotle]
|
|
609
|
Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles
[Aristotle]
|
|
610
|
The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate
[Aristotle]
|
|
611
|
Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy
[Aristotle]
|
|
9792
|
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things
[Aristotle]
|
|
9793
|
Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion
[Aristotle]
|
|
613
|
Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes
[Aristotle]
|
|
12309
|
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths
[Aristotle]
|
|
615
|
The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
616
|
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16156
|
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause
[Aristotle]
|
|
617
|
It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed
[Aristotle]
|
|
618
|
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
619
|
Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover
[Aristotle]
|
|
620
|
The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good
[Aristotle]
|
|
621
|
Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence
[Aristotle]
|
|
622
|
There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude
[Aristotle]
|
|
12097
|
There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars
[Aristotle]
|
|
623
|
It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience
[Aristotle]
|
|
624
|
Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking
[Aristotle]
|
|
625
|
Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both?
[Aristotle]
|
|
626
|
Everything is arranged around a single purpose
[Aristotle]
|
|
627
|
If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites?
[Aristotle]
|
|
628
|
Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter?
[Aristotle]
|
|
629
|
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form?
[Aristotle]
|
|
632
|
Why are some things destructible and others not?
[Aristotle]
|
|
633
|
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them
[Aristotle]
|
|
634
|
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
9075
|
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness
[Aristotle]
|
|
13738
|
It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort
[Aristotle]
|
|
9076
|
Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible
[Aristotle]
|
|
9791
|
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
9077
|
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation
[Aristotle]
|
|
635
|
The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
636
|
Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically
[Aristotle]
|
|
640
|
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any
[Aristotle]
|
|
641
|
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things?
[Aristotle]
|
|
642
|
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities?
[Aristotle]
|
|
9483
|
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy
[Aristotle]
|
|
643
|
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them?
[Aristotle]
|
|
17858
|
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers
[Aristotle]
|
|
17859
|
Units came about when the unequals were equalised
[Aristotle]
|
|
4470
|
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status
[Aristotle, by Moreland]
|
|
17860
|
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position
[Aristotle]
|
|
17861
|
Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves
[Aristotle]
|
|
645
|
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled
[Aristotle]
|
|
646
|
When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers?
[Aristotle]
|
|
647
|
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
649
|
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals
[Aristotle]
|
|
11386
|
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type
[Aristotle]
|
|
12095
|
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals
[Aristotle]
|
|
23310
|
Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences
[Aristotle]
|
|
23311
|
Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11228
|
Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
7935
|
There cannot be uninstantiated properties
[Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
|
|
12868
|
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties
[Simons on Aristotle]
|
|
11387
|
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia]
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11244
|
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16084
|
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding?
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16147
|
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16159
|
For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11287
|
Essence is what is stated in the definition
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12081
|
Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11294
|
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11298
|
Are essences actually universals?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12099
|
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16117
|
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12070
|
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12069
|
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12088
|
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11998
|
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
11378
|
How a thing is generated does not explain its essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12068
|
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
15108
|
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
|
12071
|
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances)
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11251
|
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12084
|
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16099
|
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
7603
|
God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe
[Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
|
|
16165
|
For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16119
|
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16088
|
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12062
|
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this'
[Aristotle, by Wiggins]
|
|
12083
|
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12101
|
Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16160
|
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11295
|
There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
13735
|
Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions
[Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
|
|
12353
|
Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics'
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
11246
|
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16153
|
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11282
|
Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16092
|
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12300
|
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects
[Aristotle, by Fine,K]
|
|
12077
|
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12103
|
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12299
|
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter
[Aristotle, by Fine,K]
|
|
16098
|
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
15954
|
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable
[Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
|
|
12001
|
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
16148
|
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16112
|
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
11231
|
'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance'
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12076
|
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11233
|
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance')
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12079
|
Substance is distinct being because of its unity
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11232
|
Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11293
|
Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11297
|
Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16158
|
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
12092
|
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11382
|
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12091
|
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12090
|
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11188
|
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object
[Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
|
12002
|
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
7686
|
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist
[Aristotle, by Jacquette]
|
|
16161
|
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
15109
|
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
|
11999
|
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
11284
|
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance'
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16114
|
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality')
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12096
|
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16163
|
Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16164
|
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16141
|
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16097
|
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16103
|
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16096
|
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|