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Single Idea 4584
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
]
Full Idea
At its simplest, the problem of induction can be boiled down to the problem of justifying our belief in the uniformity of nature.
Gist of Idea
The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature
Source
J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.03)
Book Ref
Baggini,J and Fosl,P.S.: 'The Philosopher's Toolkit' [Blackwells 2003], p.10
A Reaction
An easy solution to the problem of induction: we treat the uniformity of nature as axiomatic, and then induction is all reasoning which is based on that axiom. The axiom is a working hypothesis, which may begin to appear false. Anomalies are hard.
The
18 ideas
from J Baggini / PS Fosl
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4584
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The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4583
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How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4629
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Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4632
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'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4631
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In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4633
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You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4634
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Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4635
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Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4637
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To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4638
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The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin'
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4639
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Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4640
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If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y')
[Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
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4643
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The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4644
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A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4646
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Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4645
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'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false
[Baggini /Fosl]
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4647
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'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good
[Baggini /Fosl]
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