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Single Idea 9163

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction ]

Full Idea

If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status).

Gist of Idea

If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori

Source

Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.133


A Reaction

This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view).

Related Ideas

Idea 9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]

Idea 9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]


The 27 ideas with the same theme [obtaining general truth from many instances]:

Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle]
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius]
Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton]
The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking]
The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill]
Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton]
Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege]
In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege]
If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin]
The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy]
Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross]
Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery]
'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery]
If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum]
The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum]