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Single Idea 7394

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness ]

Full Idea

Only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of unconscious events could explain consciousness at all.

Gist of Idea

Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 14.4)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.454


A Reaction

This sounds undeniable, so it seems to force a choice between reductive physicalism and mysterianism. Personally I think there must be an explanation in terms of non-conscious events, even if humans are too thick to understand it.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [what causes minds to be conscious]:

Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey]
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi]
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]