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Single Idea 14958

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time ]

Full Idea

Why should not 'Napoleon' be a type, of which 'Napoleon in 1805' and 'Napoleon in 1813' are instances?

Gist of Idea

A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time

Source

J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 5.6)

Book Ref

Ladyman,J/Ross,D: 'Every Thing Must Go' [OUP 2007], p.296

A Reaction

That is very nice. That might be a view that suits presentism, where the timed instances never co-exist, and so have the sort of abstract existence that we associate with types.

The 60 ideas from J Ladyman / D Ross

14892 The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross]
14891 There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14898 Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
14897 We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross]
14899 Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
14903 Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross]
14900 In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross]
14902 Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross]
14901 Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross]
14909 Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
14905 The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross]
14904 Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross]
14907 Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross]
14908 Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross]
14910 Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross]
14911 Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross]
14912 There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross]
14913 We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross]
14914 Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross]
14916 What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
14915 The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
14918 The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross]
14920 If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross]
14921 The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross]
14922 The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross]
14923 In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross]
14924 If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross]
14928 Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross]
14926 Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
14925 The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross]
14927 Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross]
14931 That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross]
14929 A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
14930 Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross]
14932 Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]
10493 If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
14934 Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
14936 A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross]
14940 Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14937 That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross]
14939 Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross]
14938 A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross]
14942 Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
14941 We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
14943 Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross]
14944 There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross]
14945 The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross]
14946 There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14947 Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
14948 To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
14949 A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
14951 We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
14952 Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
14950 Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross]
14953 Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross]
14954 Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross]
14955 Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross]
14958 A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
14956 Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
14957 There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross]