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Single Idea 21299

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time ]

Full Idea

Though the change of any considerable part of a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole, yet we must measure the greatness of the part, not absolutely, but by its proportion to the whole.

Gist of Idea

Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6)

Book Ref

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.256

A Reaction

This seems to nicely demonstrate that the wholeness is in the mind of the perceiver, and does not simply depend on objective facts. Compare the proportion needed to change my pile of mud and my pile of gold.

The 16 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about sameness of objects over time]:

1504 Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
12503 Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
13182 Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
21299 Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume]
21300 A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume]
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
5626 An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
16025 If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
14958 A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
15396 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
22612 Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
22625 Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]