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Full Idea
The most prominent objection to contingent identity (as in the case of the statue and its clay) is that it violates Leibniz's Law.
Gist of Idea
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
Source
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], V)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.200
A Reaction
Depends what you mean by a property. The trickiest one would be that the statue has (right now) a disposition to be worth a lot, but the clay doesn't. But I don't think that is really a property of the statue. Properties are a muddle.
Related Idea
Idea 8650 Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
| 14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
| 14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
| 14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
| 14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
| 14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
| 14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
| 14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
| 14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
| 14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
| 14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
| 14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
| 14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
| 14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
| 14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |