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Single Idea 10726

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates ]

Full Idea

If a particular thing is a bundle of located universals, we might say it is a mereological fusion of them, but if two universals can be instantiated by more than one particular, then two particulars can have the same universals, and be the same thing.

Clarification

'Mereology' involves parts combining into wholes

Gist of Idea

Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing

Source

Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.26


A Reaction

This and Idea 10725 pretty thoroughly demolish the idea that objects could be just bundles of universals. The problem pushes some philosophers back to the idea of 'substance', or some sort of 'substratum' which has the universals.

Related Idea

Idea 10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [whether a mere assemblage of parts can be unified]:

Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle]
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle]
A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]
'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes]
A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza]
Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton]
A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz]
A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]