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Single Idea 17519
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
]
Full Idea
The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object.
Gist of Idea
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.139
The
15 ideas
from M.R. Ayers
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17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
[Ayers]
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17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
[Ayers]
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17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
[Ayers]
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals
[Ayers]
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17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
[Ayers]
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
[Ayers]
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17520
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Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them
[Ayers]
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17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
[Ayers]
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17518
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Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
[Ayers]
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
[Ayers]
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17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
[Ayers]
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17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous
[Ayers]
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
[Ayers]
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17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?
[Ayers]
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17516
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If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
[Ayers]
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