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Single Idea 14657

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity ]

Full Idea

Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive.

Gist of Idea

Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it

Source

Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II)

Book Ref

Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.58

A Reaction

Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc.

The 44 ideas from Alvin Plantinga

16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
13132 A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
14642 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
14643 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
14646 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
14647 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
14648 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
14649 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
14650 Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
14651 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
1475 It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG]
1474 Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG]
11891 Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
18383 Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
20704 A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
9086 The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
9087 Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
6356 Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]