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Single Idea 6054
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
]
Full Idea
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical (he is certainly not indentical to Dr Watson).
Gist of Idea
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
Source
Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.10
A Reaction
Most significant. Identity does not entail existence; identity is necessary for existence (I think) but not sufficient. But the notion of existence might be prior to the notion of identity, and the creation of Holmes be parasitic on real existence.
The
40 ideas
from 'Logical Properties'
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6042
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The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
[McGinn]
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6051
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In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
[McGinn]
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6055
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Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
[McGinn]
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6059
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Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
[McGinn]
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6053
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Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
[McGinn]
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6052
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Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
[McGinn]
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6043
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Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
[McGinn]
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6044
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Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
[McGinn]
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6046
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Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
[McGinn]
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6058
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Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
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6054
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Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
[McGinn]
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6050
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Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
[McGinn]
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6049
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Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
[McGinn]
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6045
|
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
[McGinn]
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6047
|
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
[McGinn]
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6048
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Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
[McGinn]
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6071
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Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
[McGinn]
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6072
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If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
[McGinn]
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6073
|
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined
[McGinn]
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6066
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Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
[McGinn]
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6062
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Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
[McGinn]
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6065
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We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
[McGinn]
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6067
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Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
[McGinn]
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6069
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'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
[McGinn]
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6068
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We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
[McGinn]
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6064
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Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
[McGinn]
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6070
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Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
[McGinn]
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6075
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
[McGinn]
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6074
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Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
[McGinn]
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6077
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Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
[McGinn]
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6080
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Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
[McGinn]
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6079
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If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
[McGinn]
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6082
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If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
[McGinn]
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6081
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Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
[McGinn]
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6088
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Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
[McGinn]
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6083
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The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
[McGinn]
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6084
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'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
[McGinn]
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6085
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The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
[McGinn]
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6086
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Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
[McGinn]
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6087
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Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
[McGinn]
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