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Single Idea 16778
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
]
Full Idea
Aristotle's mature ontology takes biological organisms as its paradigm substances.
Gist of Idea
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances
Source
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.1
Book Ref
Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.610
A Reaction
'Mature' is here to eliminate 'Categories' where, I take it, any coherent object counts as a substance, with the categories giving the essence. Organism are more clearly categorised, but that's all. Van Inwagen makes this idea a key one.
The
335 ideas
from 'Metaphysics'
|
12080
|
Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
22154
|
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality
[Aristotle, by Boulter]
|
|
12339
|
Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful
[Aristotle, by Badiou]
|
|
16778
|
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances
[Aristotle, by Pasnau]
|
|
12345
|
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
16095
|
Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
11199
|
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence
[Aristotle, by Aquinas]
|
|
12304
|
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge
[Aristotle, by Copi]
|
|
15107
|
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
|
543
|
All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses
[Aristotle]
|
|
12038
|
Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know')
[Aristotle, by Annas]
|
|
11245
|
Many memories make up a single experience
[Aristotle]
|
|
9088
|
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things
[Aristotle]
|
|
544
|
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals
[Aristotle]
|
|
545
|
It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
546
|
It takes skill to know causes, not experience
[Aristotle]
|
|
547
|
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge
[Aristotle]
|
|
11242
|
Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes
[Aristotle]
|
|
548
|
Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom
[Aristotle]
|
|
11241
|
Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct
[Aristotle]
|
|
549
|
All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas
[Aristotle]
|
|
11247
|
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation
[Aristotle]
|
|
11256
|
Materialists cannot explain change
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
1576
|
If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive
[Aristotle]
|
|
559
|
Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful
[Aristotle]
|
|
560
|
Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things
[Aristotle]
|
|
11258
|
We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty
[Aristotle]
|
|
561
|
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many?
[Aristotle]
|
|
11262
|
Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11263
|
Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
562
|
Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth?
[Aristotle]
|
|
11264
|
Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11265
|
Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11266
|
Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11267
|
Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11268
|
Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11269
|
Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
566
|
If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity?
[Aristotle]
|
|
11270
|
Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12074
|
The one in number just is the particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
16090
|
Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
11271
|
Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11272
|
Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11273
|
Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11274
|
Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11275
|
Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11276
|
Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11385
|
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable
[Aristotle]
|
|
568
|
Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances
[Aristotle]
|
|
569
|
If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
570
|
Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists'
[Aristotle]
|
|
12347
|
The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science
[Aristotle]
|
|
571
|
Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated?
[Aristotle]
|
|
572
|
Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry
[Aristotle]
|
|
573
|
The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy
[Aristotle]
|
|
6561
|
A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time)
[Aristotle]
|
|
574
|
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress
[Aristotle]
|
|
11281
|
We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man
[Aristotle]
|
|
575
|
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth
[Aristotle]
|
|
576
|
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former
[Aristotle]
|
|
581
|
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there!
[Aristotle]
|
|
583
|
The starting point of a proof is not a proof
[Aristotle]
|
|
584
|
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation
[Aristotle]
|
|
585
|
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes?
[Aristotle]
|
|
1602
|
For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential
[Roochnik on Aristotle]
|
|
1601
|
The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time
[Aristotle]
|
|
586
|
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't
[Aristotle]
|
|
19165
|
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes
[Aristotle, by Davidson]
|
|
588
|
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise
[Aristotle]
|
|
12611
|
Necessity makes alternatives impossible
[Aristotle]
|
|
12878
|
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter
[Aristotle, by Simons]
|
|
12612
|
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities
[Aristotle]
|
|
13272
|
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible
[Aristotle]
|
|
590
|
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations
[Aristotle]
|
|
12348
|
There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
11299
|
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence
[Aristotle]
|
|
11194
|
Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true
[Aristotle, by Aquinas]
|
|
12060
|
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
11154
|
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa
[Aristotle]
|
|
15777
|
A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
15778
|
Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them
[Aristotle]
|
|
15779
|
Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false
[Aristotle]
|
|
15780
|
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical
[Aristotle]
|
|
13273
|
Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things
[Aristotle]
|
|
591
|
Excellence is a sort of completion
[Aristotle]
|
|
13274
|
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole
[Aristotle]
|
|
15852
|
A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it
[Aristotle]
|
|
12355
|
'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner
[Aristotle]
|
|
22171
|
If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
10913
|
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations
[Aristotle]
|
|
10914
|
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking
[Aristotle]
|
|
11234
|
The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11384
|
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location
[Aristotle]
|
|
592
|
The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
11279
|
Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
10941
|
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying
[Aristotle]
|
|
10962
|
It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter'
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
|
12061
|
The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent
[Aristotle]
|
|
10942
|
If you extract all features of the object, what is left over?
[Aristotle]
|
|
595
|
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia]
[Aristotle]
|
|
16590
|
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category
[Aristotle]
|
|
11290
|
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness
[Aristotle]
|
|
11289
|
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible
[Aristotle]
|
|
11291
|
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature
[Aristotle]
|
|
11288
|
Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else
[Aristotle]
|
|
10964
|
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
|
10963
|
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
|
11292
|
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition
[Aristotle]
|
|
10944
|
A definition must be of something primary
[Aristotle]
|
|
10945
|
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are'
[Aristotle]
|
|
10946
|
Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality
[Aristotle]
|
|
12352
|
Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white
[Aristotle]
|
|
10947
|
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal
[Aristotle]
|
|
596
|
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition
[Aristotle]
|
|
11153
|
A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
10948
|
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior
[Aristotle]
|
|
16105
|
We know a thing when we grasp its essence
[Aristotle]
|
|
10949
|
Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
10950
|
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind
[Aristotle]
|
|
11285
|
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being
[Aristotle]
|
|
16575
|
Something must pre-exist any new production
[Aristotle]
|
|
10951
|
The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney'
[Aristotle]
|
|
597
|
Is there a house over and above its bricks?
[Aristotle]
|
|
10952
|
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds
[Aristotle]
|
|
10953
|
The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity
[Aristotle]
|
|
12360
|
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
10954
|
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men
[Aristotle]
|
|
16106
|
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
[Aristotle]
|
|
10955
|
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects)
[Aristotle]
|
|
11383
|
A definition is of the universal and of the kind
[Aristotle]
|
|
10956
|
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle?
[Aristotle]
|
|
10957
|
The material element may be essential to a definition
[Aristotle]
|
|
12301
|
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form
[Aristotle]
|
|
10958
|
Perhaps numbers are substances?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16107
|
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not
[Aristotle]
|
|
10959
|
The substance is the form dwelling in the object
[Aristotle]
|
|
10960
|
If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity?
[Aristotle]
|
|
10961
|
Definition by division is into genus and differentiae
[Aristotle]
|
|
12356
|
If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae
[Aristotle]
|
|
16142
|
A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
11379
|
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared
[Aristotle]
|
|
12093
|
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11380
|
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
16143
|
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality
[Aristotle]
|
|
16144
|
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
[Aristotle]
|
|
16145
|
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves
[Aristotle]
|
|
12311
|
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate
[Aristotle]
|
|
17040
|
If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too
[Aristotle]
|
|
16094
|
You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised
[Aristotle]
|
|
12094
|
No universals exist separately from particulars
[Aristotle]
|
|
599
|
We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances
[Aristotle]
|
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
16134
|
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object
[Aristotle]
|
|
16135
|
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences
[Aristotle]
|
|
11296
|
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
16136
|
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants
[Aristotle]
|
|
15840
|
If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element?
[Aristotle]
|
|
12362
|
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being
[Aristotle]
|
|
15853
|
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle
[Aristotle]
|
|
600
|
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear
[Aristotle]
|
|
601
|
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites
[Aristotle]
|
|
16753
|
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
603
|
How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16108
|
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities
[Aristotle]
|
|
16109
|
Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form
[Aristotle]
|
|
12098
|
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind
[Aristotle]
|
|
16110
|
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16085
|
Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
16086
|
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities
[Aristotle]
|
|
16152
|
Other types of being all depend on the being of substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
16113
|
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
11938
|
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it
[Aristotle]
|
|
15766
|
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things
[Aristotle]
|
|
15767
|
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen!
[Aristotle]
|
|
15768
|
An actuality is usually thought to be a process
[Aristotle]
|
|
15769
|
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence
[Aristotle]
|
|
14543
|
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows
[Aristotle]
|
|
14544
|
Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances
[Aristotle]
|
|
15770
|
Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given
[Aristotle]
|
|
16118
|
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things
[Aristotle]
|
|
15771
|
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity
[Aristotle]
|
|
15772
|
A thing's active function is its end
[Aristotle]
|
|
15773
|
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process
[Aristotle]
|
|
605
|
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
15774
|
We recognise potentiality from actuality
[Aristotle]
|
|
15775
|
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true
[Aristotle]
|
|
10916
|
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together
[Aristotle]
|
|
15776
|
There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being
[Aristotle]
|
|
10915
|
The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that
[Aristotle]
|
|
17838
|
Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process
[Aristotle]
|
|
16508
|
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force
[Aristotle]
|
|
17839
|
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
17840
|
A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing
[Aristotle]
|
|
17841
|
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
17842
|
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought
[Aristotle]
|
|
17843
|
The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number
[Aristotle]
|
|
17844
|
The unit is stipulated to be indivisible
[Aristotle]
|
|
607
|
None of the universals can be a substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
17845
|
If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle
[Aristotle]
|
|
17846
|
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
17847
|
You are one with yourself in form and matter
[Aristotle]
|
|
17848
|
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same
[Aristotle]
|
|
17849
|
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect
[Aristotle]
|
|
608
|
There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety
[Aristotle]
|
|
17850
|
Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one
[Aristotle]
|
|
17851
|
Number is plurality measured by unity
[Aristotle]
|
|
17852
|
A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction
[Aristotle]
|
|
609
|
Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles
[Aristotle]
|
|
610
|
The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate
[Aristotle]
|
|
611
|
Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy
[Aristotle]
|
|
9792
|
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things
[Aristotle]
|
|
9793
|
Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion
[Aristotle]
|
|
613
|
Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes
[Aristotle]
|
|
12309
|
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths
[Aristotle]
|
|
615
|
The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance
[Aristotle]
|
|
616
|
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity?
[Aristotle]
|
|
16156
|
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause
[Aristotle]
|
|
617
|
It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed
[Aristotle]
|
|
618
|
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
619
|
Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover
[Aristotle]
|
|
620
|
The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good
[Aristotle]
|
|
621
|
Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence
[Aristotle]
|
|
622
|
There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude
[Aristotle]
|
|
12097
|
There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars
[Aristotle]
|
|
623
|
It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience
[Aristotle]
|
|
624
|
Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking
[Aristotle]
|
|
625
|
Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both?
[Aristotle]
|
|
626
|
Everything is arranged around a single purpose
[Aristotle]
|
|
627
|
If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites?
[Aristotle]
|
|
628
|
Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter?
[Aristotle]
|
|
629
|
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form?
[Aristotle]
|
|
632
|
Why are some things destructible and others not?
[Aristotle]
|
|
633
|
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them
[Aristotle]
|
|
634
|
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
9075
|
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness
[Aristotle]
|
|
13738
|
It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort
[Aristotle]
|
|
9076
|
Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible
[Aristotle]
|
|
9791
|
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
9077
|
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation
[Aristotle]
|
|
635
|
The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement
[Aristotle]
|
|
636
|
Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically
[Aristotle]
|
|
640
|
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any
[Aristotle]
|
|
641
|
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things?
[Aristotle]
|
|
642
|
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities?
[Aristotle]
|
|
9483
|
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy
[Aristotle]
|
|
643
|
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them?
[Aristotle]
|
|
17858
|
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers
[Aristotle]
|
|
17859
|
Units came about when the unequals were equalised
[Aristotle]
|
|
4470
|
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status
[Aristotle, by Moreland]
|
|
17860
|
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position
[Aristotle]
|
|
17861
|
Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves
[Aristotle]
|
|
645
|
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled
[Aristotle]
|
|
646
|
When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers?
[Aristotle]
|
|
647
|
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular
[Aristotle]
|
|
649
|
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals
[Aristotle]
|
|
11386
|
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type
[Aristotle]
|
|
12095
|
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals
[Aristotle]
|
|
23310
|
Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences
[Aristotle]
|
|
23311
|
Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11228
|
Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
7935
|
There cannot be uninstantiated properties
[Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
|
|
12868
|
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties
[Simons on Aristotle]
|
|
11387
|
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia]
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11244
|
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16084
|
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding?
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16147
|
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16159
|
For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11287
|
Essence is what is stated in the definition
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12081
|
Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11294
|
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11298
|
Are essences actually universals?
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12099
|
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16117
|
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12070
|
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12069
|
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12088
|
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11998
|
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
11378
|
How a thing is generated does not explain its essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12068
|
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
15108
|
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
|
12071
|
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances)
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11251
|
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12084
|
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16099
|
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
7603
|
God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe
[Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
|
|
16165
|
For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16119
|
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16088
|
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12062
|
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this'
[Aristotle, by Wiggins]
|
|
12083
|
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12101
|
Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16160
|
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11295
|
There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
13735
|
Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions
[Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
|
|
12353
|
Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics'
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
|
11246
|
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16153
|
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
11282
|
Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16092
|
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12300
|
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects
[Aristotle, by Fine,K]
|
|
12077
|
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12103
|
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12299
|
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter
[Aristotle, by Fine,K]
|
|
16098
|
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
15954
|
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable
[Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
|
|
12001
|
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
16148
|
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16112
|
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
11231
|
'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance'
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12076
|
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11233
|
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance')
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12079
|
Substance is distinct being because of its unity
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11232
|
Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11293
|
Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
11297
|
Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16158
|
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
12092
|
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11382
|
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
12091
|
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
12090
|
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
11188
|
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object
[Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
|
12002
|
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
7686
|
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist
[Aristotle, by Jacquette]
|
|
16161
|
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
15109
|
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
|
11999
|
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind
[Aristotle, by Kung]
|
|
11284
|
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance'
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
|
16114
|
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality')
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
12096
|
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
|
16163
|
Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16164
|
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16141
|
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
|
16097
|
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16103
|
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|
|
16096
|
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
|