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Single Idea 8580

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism ]

Full Idea

Final definition of 'Materialism': Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; and two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates.

Gist of Idea

Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically

Source

David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat')

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.212

A Reaction

This would presumably allow for an anomalous monist/property dualist view of mind, but not full dualism. But if there are no psychophysical laws, what stops the mental changing while the physical remains the same?

The 324 ideas from David Lewis

16456 For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
16392 A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati]
18416 Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon]
18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
8433 There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich]
14361 Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
9419 A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis]
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
15400 We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
15458 A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
15457 Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis]
15459 Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
12895 Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
19562 We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
12898 Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
12899 The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
15562 Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]
15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
15564 An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
7441 Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis]
7442 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis]
10847 Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis]
10845 To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis]
10846 Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis]
21461 I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis]
9426 The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis]
16210 Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis]
7443 A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
7445 The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
7444 Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
15539 Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
15537 If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
15538 Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
8209 Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis]
10808 Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
10806 Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
10807 Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
10809 We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
10812 The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
10811 The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
10813 What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
10814 Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
10815 We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
10816 We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
15532 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
15534 We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
15535 We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
3995 A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
10470 There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
9650 Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis]
16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
9651 Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis]
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
9658 An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis]
9654 A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
15736 A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
15747 Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
15731 Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
9659 Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
8901 Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis]
8904 The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis]
8938 The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis]
8903 Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis]
8902 If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis]
8906 If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis]
8905 If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis]
8908 For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis]
8907 The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis]
8909 Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
9660 The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
16278 A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis]
16279 General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
9661 Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis]
16280 Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis]
16274 If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis]
16281 Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis]
11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
16288 Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis]
16289 We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]
9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9666 It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis]
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
9057 Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
9671 Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
23019 The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Lewis, by Baron/Miller]
23021 Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Lewis, by Baron/Miller]
10191 Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
18395 Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
10566 Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
14244 Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
15497 We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
15496 We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
15500 Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
15499 A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
15498 We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
15501 We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
15502 There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
15503 We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
15504 Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
15508 If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
15507 Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
15506 If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
15509 Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
15511 If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
15512 In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
15513 Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
15514 A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
15515 To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
15516 A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
15517 Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
15518 I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
15520 Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
15519 Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
15521 Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
15522 The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
14748 The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
15523 Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
15524 Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
15525 Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
10660 A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
6129 Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
14283 A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington]
4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
9423 If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis]
9424 A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis]
9409 Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford]
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
15540 You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis]
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9425 Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis]
16079 De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker]
14401 Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
15549 If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis]
21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
8615 We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
8614 A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
8606 A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
8607 Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
15727 Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
8611 A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]
8581 Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
8580 Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
8579 Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
16458 Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis]
4398 An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos]