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Single Idea 18899

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'.

Gist of Idea

Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism'

Book Ref

'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.17

Related Idea

Idea 18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]


The 13 ideas from 'Function and Concept'

Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]