more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 18770
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
]
Full Idea
There are sensible ways to maike a distinction between different kinds of being. ..One need not fear that this leads to a 'bloated ontology'. ...We need only distinguish 'ontological commitment' from 'existential commitment'
Gist of Idea
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being
Source
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6)
Book Ref
'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.74
A Reaction
He speaks of giving fictional and abstract entities a 'lower score' in existence. I think he means the 'ontological' commitment to be the stronger of the two.
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[nature of existence commitments]:
|
10784
|
Whenever there's speech it has to be about something
[Plato]
|
|
13879
|
For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures
[Frege, by Wright,C]
|
|
6060
|
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
[Russell]
|
|
13938
|
A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question
[Carnap]
|
|
19485
|
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
[Quine]
|
|
11101
|
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do
[Quine]
|
|
8496
|
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
[Quine]
|
|
10667
|
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible
[Quine, by Hossack]
|
|
15785
|
Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system
[Hintikka]
|
|
10548
|
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence'
[Dummett]
|
|
10281
|
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language
[Dummett]
|
|
18211
|
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
[Field,H]
|
|
12226
|
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence
[Hale/Wright]
|
|
7678
|
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
[Jacquette]
|
|
8258
|
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
[Lowe]
|
|
8301
|
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
[Lowe]
|
|
12449
|
Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences
[Azzouni]
|
|
10643
|
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments'
[Linnebo]
|
|
10668
|
We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle
[Hossack]
|
|
14491
|
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
[Thomasson]
|
|
18770
|
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being
[Anderson,CA]
|