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Full Idea
I suspect that the experiences which some philosophers want to describe as intuitions, or a quasi-sensory apprehensions, of good are not significantly different from those that I want to describe as feelings of approval.
Gist of Idea
I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval
Source
A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.239)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Philosophical Essays' [Macmillan 1965], p.239
A Reaction
This is the standard ground for rejecting intuitionism, along with the point that even if intuitions are not just feelings of approval, it seems impossible to tell the difference.
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |