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Single Idea 8698

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism ]

Full Idea

The modal structuralist thinks of mathematical structures as possibilities. The application of mathematics is just the realisation that a possible structure is actualised. As structures are possibilities, realist ontological problems are avoided.

Gist of Idea

Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised

Source

report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 4.3

Book Ref

Friend,Michèle: 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' [Acumen 2007], p.86


A Reaction

Friend criticises this and rejects it, but it is appealing. Mathematics should aim to be applicable to any possible world, and not just the actual one. However, does the actual world 'actualise a mathematical structure'?


The 13 ideas with the same theme [structuralism denying real objects or real structures]:

If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou]
Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro]
Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro]
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend]
Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend]