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Single Idea 10441
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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Full Idea
We can refer to things which change over time, which suggests that in thinking of and in referring to an individual we are not constrained to represent it as that which has certain properties.
Gist of Idea
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties
Source
Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.519
A Reaction
This seems a good argument against the descriptive theory of reference which is not (I think) in Kripke. Problems like vagueness and the Ship of Theseus rear their heads.
The
24 ideas
from Kent Bach
12900
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How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content?
[Bach]
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12901
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If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context
[Bach]
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12902
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Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think
[Bach]
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10439
|
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives?
[Bach]
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10440
|
An object can be described without being referred to
[Bach]
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10446
|
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction
[Bach]
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10441
|
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties
[Bach]
|
10447
|
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects
[Bach]
|
10442
|
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description
[Bach]
|
10443
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You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague
[Bach]
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10444
|
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential
[Bach]
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10445
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It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description
[Bach]
|
10455
|
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence
[Bach]
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10453
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In logic constants play the role of proper names
[Bach]
|
10454
|
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence
[Bach]
|
10456
|
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
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10452
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Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses
[Bach]
|
10457
|
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential
[Bach]
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10459
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Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit
[Bach]
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10460
|
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group
[Bach]
|
10458
|
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination
[Bach]
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10461
|
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions
[Bach]
|
10462
|
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance
[Bach]
|
10463
|
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it
[Bach]
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