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Single Idea 9039

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description ]

Full Idea

The strong thesis (that descriptions are sufficient for reference) is outrageous. It would mean that if Mr X is wrongly introduced to me as Mr Y, then I truly say 'this is Mr Y' if X overwhelmingly satisfies descriptions of Y.

Gist of Idea

If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit

Source

Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)

Book Ref

Evans,Gareth: 'Collected Papers' [OUP 1985], p.3

A Reaction

[I omit some qualifying phrases] Evans says that probably no one ever held this view. It seems right. In the case of an electron it would seem that all the descriptions could be the same, except space-time location. Same electron as yesterday?

The 25 ideas with the same theme [reference is fixed by a description]:

15155 Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
5387 It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
10448 If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
6268 The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
6389 To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
10435 A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
10451 Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
5813 A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
10439 What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
10441 If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
10442 We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
10445 It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
10457 Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
10463 Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
16348 Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
16384 Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
16352 A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
16353 Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
16355 Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
22245 A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]