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Single Idea 9554

[filed under theme 18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring ]

Full Idea

One can observe a system and focus attention on the relations among the objects - ignoring those features of the objects not relevant to the system. For example, we can understand a baseball defense system by going to several games.

Gist of Idea

We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features

Source

Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], p.74), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics

Book Ref

Chihara,Charles: 'A Structural Account of Mathematics' [OUP 2004], p.79


A Reaction

This is Shapiro perpetrating precisely the wicked abstractionism which Frege and Geach claim is ridiculous. Frege objects that abstract concepts then become private, but baseball defences are discussed in national newspapers.


The 64 ideas from 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro]
We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro]
We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro]
An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro]
Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro]
Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro]
Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro]
Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro]
Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro]
Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro]
A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro]
If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro]
Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro]
Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro]
Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro]
Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro]
Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro]
We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro]
Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro]
Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro]
Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro]
There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro]
The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro]
Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro]
The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro]
Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro]
Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro]
The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro]
Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend]
Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro]
Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro]
Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro]
There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro]
A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro]
The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro]
Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro]
Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro]
The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro]
Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro]
Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro]
Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro]
Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro]
The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro]
The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro]
The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro]
Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro]
Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro]
Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro]
Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro]
For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro]
Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro]
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro]
Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro]
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro]
The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro]
The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro]
Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro]
Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro]
Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro]
A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro]
We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro]