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Single Idea 10519

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete ]

Full Idea

Noonan suggests that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects should be seen as derivative from a difference between the relations centrally involved in criteria of identity associated with names of objects.

Gist of Idea

The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names

Source

Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III)

Book Ref

Hale,Bob: 'Abstract Objects' [Blackwell 1987], p.56

A Reaction

[He cites Noonan 1976, but I've lost it] I don't understand this, but collect it as a lead to something that might be interesting. A careful reading of Hale might reveal what Noonan meant.

Related Ideas

Idea 14002 Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]

Idea 10519 The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]

The 60 ideas from Bob Hale

8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
10310 Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
10307 The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale]
10308 Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
10312 Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
10313 Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
10314 An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale]
10316 We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
10315 We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
10318 Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
10322 If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
10511 It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
10513 Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale]
10514 If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale]
10512 The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
10517 Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale]
10518 Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale]
10521 If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
10523 Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale]
10522 The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
10520 Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
10519 The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]
10524 There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
19275 You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
19276 The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
19278 There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
19279 What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
19281 Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
19282 It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
19285 Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
19286 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
19288 Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
19287 Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
19289 Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
19290 Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
19291 A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
19293 Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
19294 If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
19295 Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
19296 If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
19297 The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
19298 Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
19299 Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
19300 The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
19301 With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
19302 If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
10632 The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright]
12432 Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
12433 If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
12434 Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
12435 The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
12436 Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]