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Single Idea 9929
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
]
Full Idea
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'.
Gist of Idea
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
Source
JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.A.1.d)
Book Ref
Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.179
A Reaction
Not just science. In ordinary conversation we continually refer to particulars using so-called 'universal' predicates and object-terms, which are presumably abstractions. 'I've just seen an elephant'.
The
15 ideas
from JP Burgess / G Rosen
9918
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Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9919
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The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9921
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'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9922
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If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
[Burgess/Rosen]
|
9923
|
We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9924
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Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9925
|
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together
[Burgess/Rosen]
|
9926
|
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9927
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Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9928
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Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9929
|
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9930
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Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9932
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The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory
[Burgess/Rosen]
|
9933
|
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set
[Burgess/Rosen]
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9934
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Number words became nouns around the time of Plato
[Burgess/Rosen]
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