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Single Idea 7324

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning ]

Full Idea

Grice wants to explain linguistic meaning in terms of the content of propositional attitudes, Dummett has championed the view that propositional attitudes must be explained by linguistic meaning, while Davidson says they must be explained together.

Gist of Idea

Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together?

Source

Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.1)

Book Ref

Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.178


A Reaction

A useful map. My intuition says propositional attitudes come first, for evolutionary reasons. We are animals first, and speakers second. Thought precedes language. A highly social animal flourishes if it can communicate.


The 30 ideas with the same theme [how one thing can represent another thing]:

The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]