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Full Idea
In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other.
Gist of Idea
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength
Source
Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs)
A Reaction
My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular.
| 12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
| 12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
| 12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
| 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |