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Single Idea 7384

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence ]

Full Idea

We don't need 'essences' or 'criteria' to keep the meaning of our word from sliding all over the place; our words will stay put, quite firmly attached as if by gravity to the nearest similarity cluster.

Gist of Idea

Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 13.2)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.421

A Reaction

Plausible, but essentialism (which may have been rejuventated by a modern theory of reference in language) is not about language. It is offering an explanation of why there are 'similarity clusters. Organisms are too complex to have pure essences.

The 24 ideas from 'Consciousness Explained'

7365 Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
7366 It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
7367 Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
7369 Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
7368 Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
7370 The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett]
7371 All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
7372 In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett]
7373 Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett]
7374 Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
7376 We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett]
7379 If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
7380 Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
7383 The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett]
7381 We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett]
7382 We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett]
7386 Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett]
7385 People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
7384 Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
7387 "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
7393 We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
7391 We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett]
7394 Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
14308 We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]