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Single Idea 13571

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

My current view is that individual essences (about which Kripke's essentialism has a lot to say) do not matter much from the point of view of a scientific essentialist.

Gist of Idea

Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences

Source

Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.11

A Reaction

[Kripke parenthesis on p.54] Presumably this is because science is only committed to dealing in generalities, and so natural kinds are needed for such things. I'm inclined to regard individual essences as prior in the pure ontology of the thing.

The 40 ideas with the same theme [each individual has its own distinct essence]:

13774 Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
11039 A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
12311 Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
17846 The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
12070 Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
12069 Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
12088 Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
11998 Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
12083 Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
11382 Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
16097 To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
12284 Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
12810 We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
16786 You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
15992 Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
12931 Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
12811 We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
19575 Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
20376 We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
14435 The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
15808 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
16979 It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
13571 Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
14637 Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
12244 Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
13230 Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
24067 Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]