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Single Idea 16520

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual.

Gist of Idea

We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.197

A Reaction

[Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual.

The 85 ideas from A.J. Ayer

6973 Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
6968 Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
6971 I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
6972 A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
6974 Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
5322 Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
5325 Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
5326 Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
5324 Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
5329 Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
5328 Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
5330 Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
2613 The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
5331 You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
2611 It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
8824 No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim]
15251 The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
5163 Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
5167 The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
5168 Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
6524 Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
4729 Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer]
6525 Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
6523 Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
7919 Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
5179 Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer]
5183 Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
5180 All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer]
5185 It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer]
5181 A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
5184 Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
5186 Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
5187 When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer]
5190 The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer]
5191 We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
5193 Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer]
5198 We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer]
5197 By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer]
5195 Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer]
5196 Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer]
5189 Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer]
5202 Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer]
5200 The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer]
2619 Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer]
5199 Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer]
5204 To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
4749 We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
5207 If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer]
5209 The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer]
5208 A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer]
23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
5206 To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
5205 Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
5171 The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer]
5178 A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
5177 Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
5172 If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
5173 Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer]
5176 Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer]
5169 My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer]
5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
19459 To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
19460 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
19461 Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
19463 Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
19464 We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
19462 Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]